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Abstract 
 
In the past few years, IRC bots, malicious programs which 
are remotely controlled by the attacker through IRC servers, 
have become a major threat to the Internet and users. These 
bots can be used in different malicious ways such as issuing 
distributed  denial  of  services  attacks  to  shutdown other 
networks and services, keystrokes logging, spamming, traffic 
sniffing cause  serious  disruption  on  networks and  users. 
New bots use peer to peer (P2P) protocols start to appear 
as the upcoming threat to Internet security due to the fact 
that P2P bots do not have a centralized point to shutdown 
or traceback, thus making the detection of P2P  bots is a 
real challenge. In response to these threats, we present an 
algorithm  to detect an  individual P2P  bot running  on a 
system by correlating  its activities. Our  evaluation shows 
that correlating  different activities generated  by P2P  bots 
within a specified time period can detect these kind of bots. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Internet and networks come under frequent attack from 
a diverse set of malicious programs and activity such as 
viruses and worms [3]. While the detection of such worms 
and viruses is improving a new threat has emerged in the 
form of the botnet. Botnets are distributed networks of 
infected machines, controlled remotely by a ‘botmaster’. A 
single bot, a term derived from robot, is a piece of malicious 
code that is installed on a user host and transforms host into 
a zombie machine. 
Current bots use Internet Relay Chat (IRC) command and 
control (C&C) structure to communicate with their herders. 
IRC is a chat based protocol consisting of various ‘channels’ 
to  which a  user of  the IRC network can connect. Upon 
infection  of  a  host,  the  bot  connects  to  the  IRC  server 
and joins the specified channel waiting for the attacker’s 
commands. The bot is programmed to respond to various 
commands generated by the attacker through the C&C 
structure.  Although  IRC  structures  represent  an  efficient 
way of controlling botnets, one can prevent the bots from 
communicating  with  their  herders  by  shutting  down  the 
central point. In order to avoid this problem, botnet herders 
started to deviate from using a centralised point to a another 
way  of  controlling their  bots  by  using  the  decentralised 
structures as a mean to maintain their botnets. As a result, a 
new approach of botnet structures starts to appear taking 
advantage of existing Peer-to-Peer (P2P) protocols. The 
attackers start to use P2P networks in order to control their 
botnets. By using this approach, the bots can contact other 
bots without having a centralised point for their command 
and control (C&C) structure. 
In P2P, each node acts as client-server which provides 
bandwidth,  storage  and  computational  power.  Using  this 
approach, bots are able to communicate with other bots by 
downloading files or commands from other bots’ machines 
and performing different activities. In comparison to IRC 
structures, everyone can join a P2P network, thus, the more 
peers acting as bots, the more powerful the botmaster can be. 
In addition, it will be hard to detect and shut down the botnet 
as security people would need to isolate each machine [2]. 
We present an algorithm to detect P2P bots on the in- 
fected machine by correlating bots’ behavioural attributes. A 
Peacomm (Storm P2P bot) is used as a case study. The con- 
cept of correlation attributes within specified time-window 
increases  the  level  of  malicious behaviour  confidentiality 
as depending on one process attribute may generate large 
number of false alarms. The correlation is used to com- 
bine the attributes of programs, thus, enhance the detection 
mechanism. The algorithm does not need a pre-defined bots’ 
signatures in order to detect this kind of bots. 
This paper is structured as follows: Section two discusses 
the  related  work  in  this  field. We  present  the  Peacomm 
P2P bot as a case study in Section three. We discuss our 
methodology by explaining the conducted experiments, how 
we have collected our data and the correlation algorithm in 
section four. Our results and analysis are presented in section 
five and we summarize and conclude in section six. 
 
2. Related  Work 
 
Different researches have been conducted to analyse and 
detect  peer-to-peer  bots.  For  example,  Schoof  and  Kon- 
ing [10] analyse different peer-to-peer bots such as Sinit 
and Nugache to examine the behaviour of these bots. In their 
analysis, they note that some peer-to-peer bots communicate 
on a fixed port. They argue that by monitoring traffic on that 
port, one could detect these bots. They also discover that 
some of these bots generate a large number of destination 
unreachable error messages (DU) and connection reset error 
messages while trying to connect to other peers. In addition, 
some bot’s communications are encrypted which make the 
traffic analysis a difficult task and resulting in high false 
alarms. 
 
Dittrich and  Dietrich [1]  explain  some of  the  features 
and challenges when dealing with the Nugache P2P botnet. 
Stover et al. [12] conclude that there is no static IDS that 
will  detect  Nugache  traffic. They  also  mention  that  the 
Nugache bot can be detected through various signatures of 
the infection. 
 
Holz et al. [8] present a method to analyse and mitigate 
P2P  botnet. They develop ways to mitigate Storm worm 
and introduce an active measurement technique to enumerate 
the number of infected hosts. Their way is based on either 
reverse engineered the bot binary to identify the function 
which generates the key that is used for searching for other 
infected machines and bots commands or use honeypot and 
infect it with the bot that generate a new key each time it is 
rebooted and thus enumerate all the keys. The problem with 
the first method is that the process of reverse engineering is 
needed all the time the attacker change the key generation 
functions. The other method takes long time to enumerate 
all the keys. 
 
Other research analyse different peer-to-peer bots such as 
Storm bot (Peacomm) where large number of emails are 
spammed to many accounts holding an executable attach- 
ment [2]. An in-depth analysis of Peacomm is provided by 
Stewart from SecureWorks [11]. Nunnery and Kang [7] try 
to locate the zombie nodes activities in peer-to-peer network 
by their retrieval of hashes and the control of a large group 
of network computers. They claimed that if the client within 
the controlled network searches for hash used by malware, 
it must be a zombie node. This process can also leads to 
locate the IP address of the botmaster by monitoring any 
publish activity on the supervised network. 
 
A detailed description of Peacomm is presented by Porras 
et al. [9]. They also investigate how to detect the Storm 
bot  by using a  BotHunter [5] which tracks the two-way 
communication flows between internal and external entities 
to  find  the  infected  host.  Stover  [12]  suggests  that  the 
Storm bot can be detected by configuring IDS to find the 
configuration file  used  by  the  bot.  They  also  state  that 
differentiating between the Storm bot and legitimate P2P 
communications is a difficult task. 
3. Case Study:  Peacomm  (Storm  Bot) 
 
Peacomm is one of the few known bots which implements 
a full peer-to-peer (P2P) networks generated in 2007 [7][4]. 
Peacomm uses the Overnet P2P protocol to communicate 
with other bots. The overnet protocol is an example of a 
decentralised peer network which implements the Kademlia 
algorithm [7]. The Kademlia algorithm uses distributed hash 
tables (DHT) for routing in which there is no hierarchy in 
the topology [4][7]. 
In Kademlia, to communicate with other peers, each node 
is assigned a unique 128-bit ID as a global identifier the first 
time the it starts [8]. The node shares its information with 
other peers which are close to it in the keyspace. The term 
“closeness” is based on calculating the distance between two 
peers’ identifications (IDs) using an XOR operation [6][8]. 
To publish information, each node uses its hash table as a 
data structure which maps the keys with the values. The 
key is used as an identification to retrieve information based 
on the closest distance to other peers while the value is a 
triple of node’s ID, IP address and UDP port number. The 
Peacomm bot uses this method to search for specific keys to 
communicate with other infected machines on the network 
and find the commands that should be executed [8]. 
After  an  infection,  the  bot  stores  a  configuration file 
which contains encoded information about other peers to 
communicate with [8]. Each time it makes a successful 
connection, it expands its information about the botnet by 
saving the hash (node information) into local memory. The 
bot  then  uses  the  stored  hard  coded  keys  to  search and 
download  a  secondary injection  URL  from  the  network. 
The secondary injection URL is encrypted using the RSA 
algorithm and points to a secondary injection executable. 
After that, the bot decrypts the encrypted URL using its 
stored hard coded keys. Finally, the bot downloads and 
execute the secondary injection from a web-server [7][4]. 
 
4. Methodology 
 
P2P bots are difficult to detect because they do not have 
a central point to communicate with their masters which 
makes the tracing back process difficult. In addition, new 
bots can have different signatures and using signature-based 
detection will generate false alarms specially if bots traffic 
are encrypted. For these reasons, we present an algorithm 
to detect P2P bots by investigating the effect of correlating 
their behavioural’s attributes. The aim of this investigation 
is to show that correlating different attributes can enhance 
the detection of P2P bots. 
 
4.1. Bot Scenarios 
 
For the purpose of our experimentation the Peacomm bot 
is used as previously explained. As a communication vessel, 
IceChat, an IRC client, is used for normal conversation. In 
addition,  the  Firefox web  browser  is  used  for  browsing, 
checking email and other normal activities as a normal 
application.  Two scenarios are used inactive (PmE1) and 
active (PmE2) as follows: 
•  inactive (PmE1):  In this session, the binary of Pea- 
comm bot is executed and run on a monitored host. 
Other normal applications are also running during this 
session but there are no activities from the user such 
as browsing or chatting. 
•  active (PmE2):  In this session, the Peacomm bot is 
executed  and  run  on  a  monitored  host.  In  contrast 
to (PmE1), the user uses Firefox for browsing and 
checking emails as normal activities and uses Icechat 
for having conversation with other users. 
 
4.2. Data  Collection 
 
We assume that the bot is already installed on the victim 
host,  through  an  accidental ‘trojan  horse’  style  infection 
mechanism or opening a malicious attachment which con- 
tains the bot. In this case, we use an extrusion detection 
to limit the bot activities whilst on a host machine. The 
communication of Peacomm bot is described in more details 
 
 
S1   = (DUt −DUt−1 )+(F C At −F C At−1 )+(RSTt −RSTt−1 ) 
 
The normalisation of data is based on a logarithmic scale. 
This is because we needed to cover a data of large range of 
values being produced by flooding attack and these values 
are changing rapidly. If the value of the S1    exceeds 100, 
the value is capped to a maximum value, in our case 100. 
Otherwise, the value of S1   is calculated as shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1.  Values  of S1   for P2P  experiments 
 
DU RST FCA PAMP 
0
0 
0 
!=0 
0 
!=0 
!=0 
!=0 
0
0 
!=0 
0 
!=0 
0 
!=0 
!=0 
0
!=0 
0 
0 
!=0 
!=0 
0 
!=0 
0 
100*log10(RST) 
100*log10(FCT) 
100*log10(DU) 
100*log10(RST+FCA) 
100*log10(DU+FCA) 
100*log10(DU+RST) 
100*log10(DU+RST+FCA) 
 
S2   is derived from the rate of change of number of packets 
send  per  second  (pkts/sec).  This  value  is  also  obtained 
from network statistics command line tool (netstat). Based 
on preliminary experiments, we classify the values of S2 
according to the following: 
in [8][4][12]. 
We have developed an interception program (APITrace) 
 
0 −  
 
10 min danger 
to record the required behavioural attributes and to intercept 
and capture specified function calls executed by the moni- 
tored processes. These data are then processed, normalised 
and streamed to our correlation algorithm. In terms of the 
function calls intercepted, different types of function calls 
are used as an input to the algorithm. These function calls 
include Communication functions (e.g. send, recv), File 
access functions (e.g ReadFile, WriteFile), Registry access 
functions (e.g. RegOpenKey, RegQueryValue) and Keyboard 
status functions (e.g. GetKeyboardState, GetAsynKeyStat). 
 
4.3. Signals 
 
Three signal categories are used to define the state of the 
system namely S1 , S2    and S3 . These signals are  
collected using a function call interception program - 
APITrace. Raw data from the monitored host are 
transformed into log files which are then normalised in the 
range of 0 - 100. 
In terms of the signal category semantics, S1   is a strong 
signal evidence for bad behaviour on a system. This signal 
is derived from the rate of change of three fields of netstat. 
These fields are destination unreachable (DU), failed con- 
nection attempts (FCA) and reset connections (RST). The 
choice of these fields is based on the preliminary observation 
of P2P bots. The netstat  is a command line tool used to 
display network statistics. The value of S1   is obtained from 
the following formula: 
 11 − 100 min-mid danger 
X = 101 − 1000 mid danger 
 1001 − 10000     mid-max danger  > 10000 max danger 
 
The higher the value of S2 , the more threat we have. We 
also use a logarithmic scale when using S2    and is derived 
according to the following formula: 
 
S2   = 25 ∗ log10(X ) . . . 1 ≤ X ≤ 10, 000 
 
If the rate of change of the number of packets sent per 
second exceeds 10,000, the value of S2    is capped to 100. 
In addition, if the rate of change is zero, the value of S2   is 
mapped to zero. 
Finally, S3    is derived from the time difference between 
two outgoing consecutive communication functions such as 
[(send,send),(sendto,sendto),(socket,socket)]. This is needed 
as the bot either sends information to the botmaster using 
send function call or issues SYN or UDP flooding attacks 
using  sendto  or  socket. In  normal  situations,  we  expect 
to have a large time difference between two consecutive 
functions. In addition, we expect to have a short period of 
this action in comparison to a SYN attack or a UDP attack. 
This is because the behaviour of the user when responding to 
other parties is different from bots when responding to their 
botmaster commands. Often, the normal users do not involve 
in  generating large  amount  of  traffic similar  to  flooding 
attack when they chat or when they browse the Internet. 
nTherefore, we  set  ns3  as  the  maximum time  differences 
between calling two consecutive  communication  functions. 
If the time difference is higher than ns3 , the time is classified 
input   : S= (S1 , S2 , S3 ) 
Initialise SV; 
for i = 1 to n do 
as normal and it is mapped to a 100. If the time difference 
falls below ns3 , the time difference is calculated from the 
if S1i > SV then 
 
following formula: 
 
S3   = 62.41965 ∗ log1O(Y ) 
The  value  of  62.41965  is  calculated from  preliminary 
experiments  in  which  we  observe  that  the  average  safe 
value between calling the same consecutive communication 
function calls is around 40 and any value above this value 
can be considered to be as normal. Therefore, if Y   = 4O, 
the value of S3   is capped to 100 which represent the normal 
situation. The closer the value of S3   to 0, the more malicious 
activity we have. 
The need of correlation between signals and function calls 
is required to define which processes are active when the 
signal values are modified. The more active the process, the 
more function calls it generates. Once the function calls are 
intercepted by APITrace, they are stored in different log file 
and assigned the value of the process ID to which the func- 
tion calls belong and the time at which they were invoked. 
After a certain period of time, both signal and function calls 
logs are combined and sorted based on time. The combined 
log files are parsed and the logged information is sent to the 
correlation algorithm for processing and analysis. 
XS1i = 1; 
else 
XS1i = O; 
end 
if S2i  > SV then 
XS2i = 1; 
else 
XS2i = O; 
end 
if S3i  > SV then 
XS3i = 1; 
else 
XS3i = O; 
end 
if XS1i = 1 and XS2i = 1 and XS3i = 1 then 
C orri  = 1; 
end 
end 
Algorithm  1: A correlation algorithm 
 
 
 
C orrelationF actor(C orrF ) = 
X C orri 
n 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(2) 
 
4.4. The Correlation Algorithm 
 
We have implemented a correlation algorithm to find the 
correlation between the three signals S1 , S2    and S3 .  
The correlation method is based on the two criteria. The  
first criteria is to analyse the function calls log file based on 
the frequency of API function calls generated by each  
process (i.e.  calculate  the  number  of  function  calls  
invoked  per process). The second criteria is to analyse  
the  signals log file by setting a sensitivity value (SV) for  
each signal (S1 , S2   and S3 ). 
The  algorithm  is  described  in  Algorithm  1  works  as 
follows. We set a sensitivity value (SV) and check if the 
values of S1 , S2   and S3   exceeds the specified a SV. If 
the signal value exceeds the specified SV, we assign a 
value of one to its records, otherwise, we assign a value of 
zero. Then, we examine if signals’ records have the same  
values, we assign a value of one which represents a 
correlation between the signals (S1 , S2   and S3 ) at that 
period of time. We repeat this process for all the signals in 
the signals log file. 
Then, we calculate the anomaly factor and the correlation 
factor from the following equations: 
 
n 
i=1 
where  n  is  the  time  in  seconds  and  X  is  the  signal 
record which represents a logic value (zero or one) if the 
signal value exceeds a predefined sensitivity value (SV ). 
The correlation factor represents how signals are related to 
each other and its range from zero to one. For example, if S1 
and S2   have high values than sensitivity value (SV) and S3 
has a low value than (100-SV), (note that signal values are 
normalised from zero to 100, thus we change the SV from 
zero to 100.), this will generates a high correlation between 
these  signals  at  that  time.  The  final step  is  to  calculate 
the  anomaly correlation  value (ACV) from the following 
equation: 
 
AC V  = AF ∗ exp(CorrF ) (3) 
The use of exponential form to the correlation factor in 
this formula represents the confidentiality level of how sig- 
nals are related to each other. For example, if the correlation 
factor is zero, this means that the signals in the log files 
are not correlated and the ACV will only depends on the 
anomaly factor (AF). If the correlation factor is higher than 
zero, the ACV will depend on both the anomaly factor and 
the correlation factor. Thus, the more correlation we have 
between signals, the higher the ACV will be. The maximum 
AnomalyF actor(AF ) = 
X (XS1i + XS2i + XS3i ) 
3n 
(1) value of ACV is 2.7182 which is the value of exp(O) as the 
value of anomaly factor ranges from zero to one as well. i=1 
 
 
 
 
5. Results  and  Analysis 
 
The  results  of  applying  this  technique  are  shown  in 
Table 2. In this table, the frequency of API function calls for 
each process for the conducted experiments and the anomaly 
correlation values (ACV) when applying different SV are 
presented (SV=10,20,30,40,50). As shown from this table, 
we note that changing SV value generates different anomaly 
correlation values (ACV). If we increase the sensitivity of the 
system by increasing the SV, this will lead to the reduction 
of ACV as shown in Table 2. 
To detect malicious activity, a threshold value is needed. 
Setting a threshold value T = 5O detects malicious activities 
on system for experiments PmE1 and PmE2 when SV ranges 
from 10 to 30 but cannot detect malicious activity on the 
system when we increase the value of SV to 40 or more. 
Therefore, setting a threshold level in the range 10 to 30 will 
generate zero false positive alarms and 100% true positive 
alarms for the two conducted experiments. 
Another important question is to know which processes 
are malicious and which processes are normal. Using the 
frequency of API function calls for each process as an 
indicator,  it  will determine which process is  normal and 
which process is malicious in this case study. For example, 
based on the frequency of API function calls, the Peacomm 
is a malicious process in experiments PmE1 and PmE2. 
 
Table 2.  The results of using the correlation algorithm 
when (1) applying different sensitivity values (SV) to 
calculate the Anomaly Correlation Value (ACV) and (2) 
considering the frequency of API function calls per 
process for P2P  bots. 
 
Experm. Process Freq. ACV (>SV)
10 20 30 40 50
 
PmE1 
Peacomm 
Firefox 
Icechat 
617349 
9902 
71 
 
0.68 
 
0.60 
 
0.52 0.45 0.34
 
PmE2 
Peacomm 
Firefox 
Icechat 
628838 
4449 
9464 
 
0.69 
 
0.63 
 
0.56 0.44 0.33
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
P2P  bots  are  difficult to  detect  as  there  is  no  central 
point  of  communications. In  addition, analysing network 
traffic looking for signatures can be tedious task because 
bots signatures can be dynamic and encrypted. In this work, 
we have developed a correlation algorithm to detect bots 
on  the  system by  correlating their  behavioural  activities. 
Our results show that correlating different activities can 
enhance the detection mechanisms and reduce the false 
alarms. One disadvantage of this algorithm is that the value 
of threshold to detect malicious processes is undefined and 
further  experiments  are needed to  set a  proper threshold 
for detecting malicious activity in the system. In addition, 
different types of P2P bots should be examine to verify the 
accuracy of the correlation algorithm. 
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